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-
- Copyright (c) 1990 - 1994
- All Rights Reserved to NetZ Computing Ltd., Israel
-
-
- User's Guide
- and
- Installation Instructions
-
- Warranty And Licensing Agreement
-
- InVircible and ResQdisk (Tm) 1990-1994 are trademarks and copyright
- with all rights reserved to NetZ Computing Ltd. (NCL), Israel. You, as
- the purchaser of license rights to the software, are herein referred to
- as the Licensee. The Licensee may not assign the license rights to the
- software without the prior agreement of NCL.
-
- The installation of this software package constitutes acceptance and
- full agreement to the terms and conditions of this warranty and
- licensing agreement, in so doing the Licensee agrees to be bound by
- said provisions. This is a legal agreement between the Licensee as the
- end user -- and NetZ Computing Ltd. who is the owner of all rights to
- the software. Usage of the InVircible software indicates acceptance of
- the terms and conditions.
-
- License: InVircible is licensed, it is not sold. The Licensee is
- obtaining limited rights to use the InVircible software. The Licensee
- is licensed to use InVircible on a single IBM-style personal computer.
- The distribution floppy of InVircible has provisions for registering
- two installations to the hard disk. Only one registered installation to
- one hard disk is licensed with this disk package. The second
- installation is reserved for the Licensee as a backup. Site licenses
- are available for individuals or organizations with multiple
- installation requirements. Alteration or reverse-engineering of the
- programs is not authorized, such attempts terminate this license
- agreement and may result in unpredictable and irreversible damage.
-
- Limited Warranty/Limitation of Remedies: Defective diskettes will be
- replaced, at no charge, if they are returned freight pre-paid, within
- 30 days of the original purchase date. The sole remedy available to the
- Licensee will be limited to the replacement of defective diskettes as
- outlined, or a refund at the purchase price of this software program
- package.
-
- InVircible is provided "as is". The Licensee assumes all responsibility
- for the determination of the suitability of this software for
- Licensee's configuration and the results and performance of this
- software program package. NetZ Computing, the distributor, and their
- suppliers do not warrant, guarantee, or make any representations
- regarding the use of, or the results obtained with, the program in
- terms of correctness, accuracy, reliability, legality, or otherwise. In
- no event shall NetZ Computing Ltd., the distributor, nor anyone else
- involved in the creation, production, or delivery, of this product be
- held liable for any damages, loss of profit, consequential, or other
- damages, that may arise out of the Licensee's use or inability to use
- the InVircible programs. Some states do not allow excluding or limiting
- implied warranties or limiting liability for incidental or
- consequential damages, so the above limitation may not apply to the
- Licensee. This limited warranty and license agreement is governed by
- the laws of the State of Israel.
-
-
- Table Of Contents
-
- Preface
-
- Quick Start Instructions
-
- 1. Introduction
- 1.1 What are computer viruses?
- 1.2 InVircible's Main Features.
-
- 2. Getting Started.
- 2.1 Working from the InVircible Floppy.
- 2.2 Preparation of the Rescue Diskette.
-
- 3. Using the Main Menu (IVMENU).
- 3.1 IVMENU Special Keys.
- 3.2 The IVMENU Caution Panel.
- 3.3 The Last IVB, IVSCAN or IVX Report.
-
- 4. InVircible Installation .
- 4.1 Installation to Hard-disk.
- 4.2 Installation to LAN Server.
- 4.3 Installation Under OS/2.
- 4.4 Installation in the Sentry Mode.
-
- 5. Recommended Anti-Virus Strategy.
- 5.1 In the Single User Environment.
- 5.2 In a Network Environment.
- 5.3 In the Institutional Environment
- 5.4 In Unattended Installations (e.g. Bulletin
- Board Systems).
-
- 6. IVB - The file Protection & Restoration Program
- 6.1 The Extra-Security Feature.
- 6.2 Off-line Backup of the Database-Files-Tree.
-
- 7. IVX - The Correlation Scanner.
-
- 8. ResQdisk - The Boot-Area and CMOS Maintenance program.
- 8.1 Reconstruction of the Boot Block.
- 8.2 Regaining Access to an "Invalid Drive".
- 8.3 ResQdisk's Setup Utility.
-
- 9. IVSCAN - The Virus Detection and Removal Scanner
- 9.1 Removing Generic Boot Viruses from Floppies
-
- 10. A Primer to Generic and Special Methods.
- 10.1 Generic Method Selection
- 10.2 Generic Boot-Block Recovery
- 10.3 Fat Manipulators Removal
- 10.4 Inverse Piggy-Backing (IP).
- 10.5 The Virus Interrogation technique.
- 10.6 Forced Self Restoration.
- 10.7 Screening New Software.
-
- 11. Importing InVircible into Windows.
- 12. Virus Handling under OS/2.
- 13. Central Point Anti Virus Inoculation
- 14. The Antivirus TSR (Terminate and Stay Resident).
- 15. Procedures to Use if Virus Activity is Suspected.
- 16. For Computer Security Expert and Advanced User.
-
- Preface
-
- This manual provides the essential information for the installation and
- use of InVircible. The InVircible software is user friendly, intuitive
- and will provide long-lasting virus protection. After installation
- InVircible functions unobtrusively without the need for ongoing user
- actions.
-
- The key component of InVircible is a rule-based Expert System that
- insures that most of virus attacks will be detected and removed from
- your IBM PC-class DOS system. For those situations where complex or
- compound virus attacks are detected, InVircible's utilities and this
- manual's guidelines provide for a user directed thoroughly complete
- restoration. In addition to background and program documentation, this
- manual provides guidelines for minimizing ongoing threats to the
- well-being of your PC's health. InVircible may be installed and used
- with assistance only from the on-line user help, so many InVircible
- users operate without the manual. A Quick Start section in this manual
- guides the user who prefers to install immediately and re view the
- manual in detail later.
-
- InVircible's basic features, the integrity checker, the correlation
- scanner, the virus scanner and the ResQdisk program are accessed via a
- menu using the IVMENU command. Command line execution is also
- available. Advanced features are integral components of the InVircible
- package; those advanced features are used rarely during day-to day
- operation in defense against simple virus attacks. Since most virus
- attacks are uncomplicated solo attacks of your system, InVircible's
- basic features will give you excellent ongoing protection. The advanced
- features are always available for simple or complex virus attacks and
- provide you with leading edge technology capabilities to eradicate even
- the most clever and troublesome viruses.
-
- InVircible provides a layered approach to protection from computer
- viruses. The first layer are the InVircible automatic detection and
- recovery features, embedded in IVINIT, which provides InVircible with
- extreme resistance to being bypassed or attacked by viruses. The second
- layer is the IVB integrity checker and restorer that secures your
- files, detects and eradicates new viruses (especially the
- "unrecoverable" viruses) and recovers the files that become infected
- with one or more viruses. The third layer are IVX and IVSCAN, the
- correlation and virus scanners for tracing down infected files and for
- the elimination of common or unknown viruses.
-
- In support of the above are: IVTEST, a module that checks computer
- memory for viral activity in real time, and ResQdisk, an advanced tool
- for inspecting and recovering the critical boot sectors and data of
- your hard disk.
-
- InVircible avoids common problems of other anti-virus software.
- InVircible programs recover themselves in case they become infected,
- even from stealthy viruses. InVircible does not allow a "fast infector"
- virus to "piggyback" its scanners and to infect an entire hard disk
- drive. InVircible utilize an efficient virus activity probe instead of
- memory resident (TSR - terminate and stay resident) component in its
- protection scheme.
-
- InVircible allows you to automatically recover from virus attacks; or
- you may prefer to manually guide the recovery.
-
-
- Quick Start Instructions
-
- Insert the InVircible diskette into the A: or B: floppy drive.
-
- Type A: or B: at the command prompt line.
- Type INSTALL/FAST to start the quick installation procedure.
-
- The InVircible INSTALL first examines your system for in- memory viral
- activity and infected hard disk drive boot areas and files. After these
- initial tests, InVircible then installs itself on your system to a
- default directory. If you prefer to install InVircible with parameters
- other than the default then use the plain INSTALL command. During the
- installation phase, all files on hard disk drive partitions will be
- scanned, then "secured" by IVB, the integrity checker. Although
- InVircible's functions are designed to be exceptionally fast, this
- initial scanning and securing of a large number of files may take a few
- minutes, so please be patient! Whenever a choice is provided, the
- default selection is the recommended choice. We encourage you to
- configure your system so that IVTEST, the real time viral activity
- checker, is activated when you invoke a frequently used batch (BAT)
- file (see Sections 4).
-
- NOTE: Preparation of a Rescue Diskette (Section 2) is critical for
- effective recovery from boot block and complex viral attacks. The
- preparation is needed before a virus infection may occur.
-
- Using InVircible
-
- Type IVMENU to access the user-friendly menu. Choose your selection by
- using the keyboard or a mouse.
-
- The Integrity Test option activates IVB, the integrity checker. Choose
- the Virus Scanner option to activate IVSCAN, the virus scanner. The F1
- key provides access to the extensive, on-line, interactive hypertext
- manual. You may exit InVircible by pressing the F10 key, Alt+X, Alt+Q
- or clicking the mouse on the 'quit' field from the main panel. The
- escape key (Esc) returns you to the previous IVMENU panel.
-
- After IVB is selected, you choose the drive partition and directories
- to examine and whether to "validate", "secure", or "restore" files.
- When selecting IVSCAN, you choose the drive partition to scan, the
- directory (or directories) to examine, and whether to "scan" viruses or
- "remove" them also. For IVB and IVSCAN, it is usually best to utilize
- the default choice first, i.e., either "validating" or "scanning".
- These advisory modes notify you of suspicious activity. You may then
- make an informed decision regarding the appropriate action to take.
-
-
- Suggested Protection Routine
-
- IVINIT will check on any initialization of the computer that the boot
- block and operating system are intact.
-
- IVB will automatically run a daily check of all your executable files
- in all local partitions on the hard drive. IVB is the primary tool for
- monitoring the integrity of files and for their recovery in the event
- of a virus infection. IVB will report changes in executable files. Some
- changes in executable files are expected if you generate your own
- applications and program executable filenames are reused. IVB will
- normally prompt and suggest the renewal of the database file in a
- directory, in case the changes are a new version of a program. Yet,
- software developers will need to be aware when alterations are
- legitimate and when they are not. User generated executable should be
- secured immediately with IVB. When installing new software packages,
- scan the diskettes with IVSCAN before installation. After installation
- run IVB on all directories to secure any added executable file.
-
- Application programs such as DOS or Windows do not change normally
- unless they have been upgraded or purposely changed such as adding or
- deleting an entry to the SETVER table. A consistent change pattern
- reported by IVB indicates a viral infection. IVB provides this
- information both on screen and in a report file (IVB.RPT) placed in the
- partition root directory. Print this file to help assess the situation
- if you suspect virus activity. A report of only a single file having
- become modified requires you to proceed carefully ! Viruses rarely
- infect only one file, so an indication of a single modified file may
- not necessarily indicate the presence of a virus.
-
- When a genuine infection is found, try IVSCAN first, to discard the
- possibility of an infection by a common virus.
-
- Viruses unknown to IVSCAN may be removed using IVB, provided the
- programs were secured before becoming infected.
-
- New viruses, unknown to IVSCAN or where no securing signatures exist,
- can be found using IVX. The suspected files can have their extension
- name be renamed to a non- executable one and the files can then be
- replaced from backup.
-
-
- 1. Introduction
-
- 1.1. What are Computer Viruses?
-
- Computer viruses are sophisticated computer code written by imaginative
- programmers, having little respect to other's people work. Their
- motives are many, but the indisputable fact is that there exist already
- thousands of them, and several new ones are written daily! Viruses have
- to be purposely designed and written, they don't just appear from
- nowhere. However, to be a virus, there is one characteristic this
- program must have: It must replicate (or copy) itself so that it can
- spread. In order to assure its continuous spreading, the virus program
- must take control of the program's execution, either if it is a
- bootstrap program or an application file.
-
- Computer viruses are passed the same ways we obtain software; by
- copying from friends, from bulletin board systems, with newly purchased
- PCs and even in vacuum wrapped new software.
-
- 1.1.1 Categories of Computer Virus
-
- There has been much discussion regarding computer viruses and elaborate
- technical names are being used, such as stealthy, polymorphic,
- multipartite, spawning and self- encrypting. In reality, there are only
- two general virus categories:
-
- (1) Viruses that infect through the boot sector or partition
- table (MBS);
- (2) Viruses that infect through files;
-
- All encountered viruses fall into one of the above two categories or
- both. There are multipartite viruses that combine the properties of the
- two categories (boot and file). Such are the Junkie, Natas and Tequila
- viruses.
-
- A new variant of file viruses emerged in late 1991. It manipulates the
- file allocation table (FAT) in order to spread. We will call them FAT
- manipulators or cluster infectors.
-
- For the sake of reference, below is a quick definition of terms that
- are used to describe viruses and techniques employed by viruses:
-
- 1.1.2 File Viruses
-
- A file infector attacks executable program files, having a COM or EXE
- extension name. File infectors may corrupt non- executable files as
- well but they cannot spread this way, unless the affected file is
- renamed to an executable filename and executed.
-
- Many file viruses are memory resident (TSR). After an infected file is
- executed, they will remain resident in the computer's memory until the
- computer is turned off. While in memory they will continue to infect
- other programs and may interfere with normal operations. If the
- computer is turned off they will lie dormant until an infected file is
- executed and then load themselves back into memory again until the next
- time the computer is turned off.
-
-
- 1.1.3 Boot Viruses
-
- Boot viruses attack boot records and master boot records (MBR,
- sometimes referred as the partition sector). When the computer is
- turned on, it runs a couple of tiny program from the hard disk, first
- the partition bootstrap and then the boot loader, to ready itself for
- work. In case of a boot infection, one of these programs may simply be
- a virus. Boot viruses will remain active in memory while the computer
- is on. During this time they will infect write enabled floppies
- that the computer accesses.
-
-
- 1.1.3 Multipartite Viruses (boot and file infectors)
-
- Multipartite viruses infect both executable files and boot- partition
- sectors. When the computer is turned on the virus will be active and
- infect additional programs that are executed. Multipartite viruses are
- sometimes referred to as 'droppers', meaning that when an infected file
- is executed, it will drop its own boot program into the hard drive boot
- area.
-
-
- 1.1.4 FAT Manipulators (file infectors)
-
- The FAT manipulators are basically file infectors, with a unique
- infection mechanism. FAT manipulators are inherently stealth viruses
- because they hide the increase in file length, although the virus code
- is actually appended to the file. The way it is done is by inserting
- the extra clusters in the file's clusters chain in the FAT. Two well
- known such viruses are Dir-2 and 1963 (Necropolis). FAT manipulators
- are also excellent piggy-backers.
-
- 1.1.5 Techniques used by Computer Viruses.
-
- 1.1.5.1 Stealth
-
- Stealth viruses are so named because they actively seek to hide
- themselves to prevent detection. Stealth viruses that infect files will
- subtract their own size (in bytes) from the infected host file at any
- time that a directory (DIR) command is executed. The Whale virus is a
- good example of this. When it infects a file it adds 9216 bytes (and
- some mutations may reach even 16 Kb in length) to the file size (a copy
- of itself). If the DIR command is issued, it subtracts the virus length
- (9216 bytes) from the displayed host file length. Thus it effectively
- hides itself from the computer operator eye and from the operating
- system.
-
- Some boot viruses use stealth (spoofing) techniques too. Stealth boot
- viruses will deceit editing tools such as Norton's Disk Editor. Example
- of stealth boot viri are Monkey and Noint. Natas and Gingerbread Man
- are multipartite viruses that use boot spoofing too.
-
- 1.1.5.2 Encryption
-
- Most of modern viruses use encryption to evade detection by scanners.
- An encrypted virus has a very short common encryptor (from as few as 3
- bytes, to a couple of dozen bytes) and the rest of the virus code is
- encrypted and differs from copy to copy of the virus. The detection of
- encrypted viruses cause high false alarm rates due to the ambiguity in
- the detection of the short common string.
-
- 1.1.5.3 Mutation Engine or Polymorphism
-
- Polymorphic viruses are a higher order of encrypted viruses. In
- addition to encryption, they use a "mutations generator" that scrambles
- the encryption too. A polymorphic virus mutates itself, so that each
- occurrence is totally different from the one before. This creates huge
- difficulties for anti- virus scanners, because they cannot look for a
- 'known' virus signature. Polymorphic viruses have rendered scanners
- effectively useless since they cannot be removed by an algorithmic
- approach.
-
- 1.1.5.4 Spawning (or Companion) Viruses.
-
- Companion viruses take advantage of the precedence DOS gives to COM
- over EXE files in the order of execution. If there are two files
- bearing the same name, one with a COM extension name and the other with
- an EXE extension, then DOS will execute the COM file first. A companion
- virus is basically a Trojan that "infects" EXE files by spawning itself
- into a companion COM file, bearing the same name as the EXE file.
- Sometimes the companion virus file will have its attribute set to
- 'hidden', to avoid its detection by the DIR command.
-
- 1.2 InVircible's Main Features
-
- * It handles both known and unknown computer viruses.
- * It is extremely fast, professional and easy to operate;
- * Does not require any costly updates;
- * Is self-sufficient and provides real time recovery from new or
- unknown viruses. Does not need outside assistance;
- * Has Extremely low false-alarm or 'false positives', with the highest
- probability of 'true positives' detection;
- * Uses a unique unobtrusive file protection and restoration scheme.
- * Has an automatically updating distributed database for restoration
- of files.
- * Has redundant and user-defined security features.
- * Uses a unique generic virus behavior probe and sampler.
- * Is not memory-resident and does not adversely affect computer
- performance.
- * Uses unique programs that automatically check themselves for, and
- restore themselves from virus infection.
- * Is friendly and uses a menu-driven user interface.
- * Features an interactive installation utility.
- * Is compatible with all major LANs (Local Area Networks).
- * Has an indispensable toolbox for computer security experts and
- advanced users.
- * Has generic procedures for full recovery from the Dir-2 and 1963 FAT
- and directory manipulators.
- * Utilizes sabotage-resistant protection designed to avoid both human-
- and virus-based deception.
- * Is piggybacking resistant to prevent InVircible from be coming a
- virus carrier.
- * Has extensive context-sensitive hypertext on-line help; and
- * Is financially affordable;
-
-
- 2. Getting Started
-
- 2.1 Working from the InVircible Floppy.
-
- InVircible is to be used from the hard disk drive. Yet, it can be used
- from the original distribution floppy. Boot the computer from either a
- DOS diskette or from the hard disk. Put the original diskette in one of
- the floppy drives and run IVMENU from the InVircible diskette. For
- reading the on- line hypertext manual either run IVHELP or use the F1
- key when in IVMENU.
-
- 2.2 Preparation of the Rescue Diskette.
-
- The Rescue Diskette is a bootable floppy, containing the necessary
- InVircible programs, the hard-disk's boot-areas image files, the data
- stored in the CMOS, a copy of your AUTOEXEC.BAT and CONFIG.SYS and some
- useful DOS files such as FDISK, SYS, and UNFORMAT. It enables to
- recover the boot areas of a given hard-disk, the CMOS settings, as well
- as the recovery of files in case of infection. The Rescue Diskette is
- fully operable only on a computer that has the registration key
- installed on the hard disk.
-
- Install InVircible normally to the hard disk and reboot the computer to
- make the installation effective. Insert a formatted diskette into drive
- A and run INSTALL/R. First, the system and InVircible files will be
- transferred to the diskette, to make it bootable. Then, the boot areas
- of your hard-drive will be backed-up to the diskette. Write-protect the
- diskette.
-
- Partitioning device drivers (e.g. SpeedStor), disk- compression
- (Stacker, SuperStor, DoubleSpace), password drivers etc., required to
- recognize partitions or drives at booting time, should be installed
- onto the Rescue Diskette. DoubleSpace, Stacker and Ontrack's Disk
- Manager are all taken care of by InVircible.
-
- In other cases, copy the driver to the rescue-disk and edit its
- CONFIG.SYS file by an ASCII editor. It should contain an appropriate
- DEVICE line for each driver to be loaded at booting time.
-
- There is no point in preparing a Rescue Diskette for a computer without
- a hard disk. The Rescue Diskette is individual to the specific
- hard-disk for which it was prepared. Rescue Diskettes should never be
- swapped between computers.
-
-
- 3. Using the Main Menu (IVMENU).
-
- IVMENU may be started in different modes by using the command line
- options. By default IVMENU will start in the Integrity Check mode, on
- the current drive. IVMENU's command line syntax is:
-
- IVMENU [/switch] [drive:]
- Switches:
-
- /V to start in the Virus Scan mode,
- /R to start the ResQdisk boot block maintenance utility.
-
- The "drive" option will home IVMENU to a different than the current
- drive at startup. The switches and the drive option may be used in
- combination in any order.
-
- There are several ways to change options and modes with IVMENU, just
- use the keyboard or the mouse anyway you like. Any "sensible" action
- will respond accordingly.
-
-
- 3.1 IVMENU Special Keys.
-
- Alt + key combinations: the Alt key combined with either I, H, R or V
- will switch to the Integrity Check, Hyper- Correlator, ResQdisk or
- Virus Scanner respectively.
-
- Ctrl + key combination: the Ctrl key, when combined with a character
- from A to Z will change the current drive to the one selected, if
- available.
-
- Alt + G shortcut control: the shortcut hot-key is labeled "Go" when a
- mouse is found or "Alt + G" when the mouse is inactive. The shortcut
- control may be used to proceed with the selected mode without further
- selections. Press Alt+G or click the mouse on the green "traffic light"
- at the top center of IVMENU's display.
-
- 3.2 The IVMENU Caution Panel.
-
- The CAUTION PANEL is at the right-hand side of IVMENU's main screen. It
- displays various parameters on InVircible settings as well as selected
- warnings, related to possible virus problems.
-
- The first two entries are dedicated to memory stealing alert. In case
- DOS reports less than the expected memory, a message indicating the
- number of missing kilobytes will pop up. The message will prompt for
- confirmation to set the alert threshold to the difference detected.
- Once set, IVMENU and the InVircible programs will ignore missing
- memory, if equal to the set threshold. The threshold is reset
- automatically to zero when IVMENU detects more DOS memory than the
- current threshold setting.
-
- A Low memory message will be displayed in case missing memory is
- detected and the user didn't confirm the setting of the threshold.
- There are instances when less than 640 Kbytes of DOS base memory is
- normal, such as with certain settings of the setup or in certain
- compatibles, especially when booted from a diskette (Acer, some Dell
- models, HP etc.).
-
- The third entry is the current database file name. This filename may be
- changed through IVMENU by selecting Rename from the Integrity Check
- menu. IVMENU will prompt for a name, or ask to press Enter to reset to
- the IVB.NTZ default filename. See also for "extra security" in the IVB
- topic.
-
- The fourth entry indicates the available space in bytes on the target
- drive. In case the available space on disk decreases, a Disk space
- lost! message will come up, indicating the number of bytes "lost". In
- case lost space is reported, one should be aware of the possibility of
- virus piggybacking. IVB or IVSCAN will stop the scanning process in
- case piggybacking is detected.
-
- The fifth entry indicates the frequency of the full disk Integrity
- Check. If InVircible was properly installed, it should be either DAILY
- or WEEKLY. If not, re-INSTALL InVircible as detailed elsewhere.
-
- The last entry checks for the registration status and will indicate
- "full" or "detection only". The empty field at the bottom is reserved
- for warning messages.
-
-
- 3.3 The Last IVB, IVSCAN or IVX Report.
-
- The last report generated by either IVB, IVSCAN or IVX can be viewed on
- screen through IVMENU. Select the Last Report in the Integrity Check or
- Virus Scan mode. The IVX report can be viewed in either modes by
- pressing the X key and then Enter. The report files are written to the
- target's root directory and named IVSCAN.RPT, IVB.RPT or IVX.RPT. The
- report file can redirected to the printer by DOS command, either PRINT
- filename or TYPE filename > PRN.
-
- 4. InVircible Installation
-
- 4.1 Installation to Hard-disk.
-
- Insert the InVircible diskette in drive A or B. Log-in to that drive.
- Run INSTALL to begin the installation.
-
- The INSTALL program will prompt for the directory to install to. Type
- the full pathname of the preferred location or just press Enter for the
- default, when prompted.
-
- The Utilities sub-menu, has the following options:
-
- a. The Batches sub-menu. Enables the insertion/removal of the
- IVTEST command to/from batch files in specified directories. The
- installation of the IVTEST probe in batch files is optional.
- IVTEST will be installed in its "quiet" mode. IVTEST messages
- will be displayed only if suspect activity is detected.
-
- b. The Rescue-Disk sub-menu, for the preparation of the diskette.
-
- c. The On-line Registration sub-menu. Enables the on-line
- registration of InVircible by telephone and credit card. Call
- your local dealer for more details.
-
- d. The Key Installation/Removal sub-menu. Enables either the
- installation or removal of the InVircible registration key
- to/from the hard drive. The process is reversible.
-
- 4.2 Installation To or From LAN Server.
-
- InVircible is a universal anti-virus, recommended for both single user
- PCs as well as for all popular LAN brands.
-
- INSTALL enables the installation of InVircible to a file server or to a
- workstation in a network. The default is installation to a single user
- PC's hard disk.
-
- Select where to install InVircible (singe user PC - the default -, to
- a file server, or to a workstation in a network) from the Install
- sub-menu. Note that the installation (or removal) of the registration
- key to the hard disk can be done from the original diskette only.
-
- InVircible may be installed to any chosen directory on the server. The
- contents of the server should be secured by the LAN manager.
-
- All stations connected to the network and equipped with a hard-drive
- need individual registration. The file server does not need the
- installation of the registration key. Any workstation in the network
- having a hard disk may be infected prior to logging-in to the network.
- Therefore, any such station needs its own InVircible installation.
-
- 4.3 Installation Under OS/2.
-
- The InVircible INSTALL procedure must be run from a plain DOS
- environment. If INSTALL is attempted from OS/2, a warning message will
- request the user to boot from DOS and try again.
-
- 4.4 Installation in the Sentry Mode.
-
- There are instances when only the detection and alerting functions of
- InVircible's are needed. To install InVircible in the sentry mode
- (detection only), just skip the key transfer step in the installation
- procedure by running INSTALL/FAST or by leaving the write protect of
- the InVircible diskette in the protect position. The retraction of the
- registration key from the hard disk back to the diskette will also
- switch InVircible to the sentry mode.
-
- The sentry mode is indicated by the "Detection only" label instead of
- "Full Registration", in IVMENU's Caution Panel and in the upper left
- corner of the program's panel.
-
- 5. Recommended Anti-Virus Strategy
-
- 5.1 In the Single User Environment.
-
- Install InVircible to the hard drive, as instructed above. The INSTALL
- utility will edit the AUTOEXEC file, after prompting for permission,
- and add the necessary commands for automatic tests to be run on the
- computer initialization. None of the InVircible programs will load
- itself and stay resident in memory. Once it completed its function, it
- will unload and leave the maximum of available memory to the
- applications.
-
- From now on, InVircible will detect and correct the most severe
- problems right at initialization. These include partition or boot
- sector tampering and certain operating system changes. Boot viruses
- such as Michelangelo, Stoned and Monkey will simply be purged from the
- disk immediately at startup.
-
- It some cases, InVircible may just alert, without correcting, on the
- presence of a suspected activity in the computer. Such alert is
- accompanied by a message describing the generic nature of the problem
- and the recommended corrective action.
-
- On first booting at any given-date, IVB will scan through all the hard
- disk local partitions. On successive initializations on the same date,
- only the root directory will be scanned. Added programs will be
- automatically secured on the daily scan. If weekly scans are preferred,
- change the DAILY argument to WEEKLY, in the AUTOEXEC file.
-
- Read Only drives (CD ROM): CD drives cannot (and need not) be secured.
- The INSTALL utility will normally detect ROM drives and disable their
- daily check. In case it hasn't, just add a space and a dash at the end
- of the daily command. For example, if D: is a CD drive, modify the
- command as follows:
-
- IVB C: DAILY -
-
- Make frequent data backups. Data should be backed-up at reasonable
- intervals. Programs should be backed-up only once or kept preferably on
- the original distribution disks.
-
- It is highly recommended to regularly run a FAT backup program, such as
- MIRROR from DOS 5 or IMAGE from Norton Utilities, from the last line of
- the AUTOEXEC.
-
- The InVircible system uses a unique virus-activity probe and sampler,
- called IVTEST. Since the reliability of memory-resident activity
- monitors is limited only to known viruses, and some of them are
- obtrusive or risky, there is need to verify from time to time, that a
- viral process is not spreading in the system. This is achieved by the
- automatic running of IVTEST, from frequently used BATCH files. The
- INSTALL utility will add the appropriate command into specified
- directories.
-
- 5.2 In a Network Environment.
-
- Any workstation equipped with a hard disk, should have its own
- InVircible installation. The InVircible distribution diskette for LAN
- installations has multiple registration keys, according to the number
- of licensed users. The registration key should be installed only to
- local hard disks, in workstations equipped with.
-
- It is recommended that the LAN manager run a daily IVB inspection of
- selected directories of the server. This can be done by adding command
- lines in the network schedule file or script. IVB returns an errorlevel
- exit-code. Errorlevel 0 means no findings, and anything else may
- indicate virus activity. Test for errorlevel 1 in batch or script files
- for suspect activity alerting.
-
- It is normal to find modified files in users directories, especially if
- they develop software. On the other hand, modified files with a
- consistent change pattern should alert on the possibility of a virus in
- the system. IVB will assess whether the changes may be a new version of
- a former program. IVB will then prompt if to renew the database file
- for that specific directory.
-
- 5.3 In the Institutional Environment
-
- Most institutional installations involve combinations of single users
- and network users, requiring an anti-virus plan that is a combination
- of the preceding strategies. Many large institutions also have an
- anti-virus policy requiring that virus related problems be dealt with
- only by qualified personnel. In this situation the InVircible
- registration key is not installed or is removed from systems not
- authorized to deal with virus removal. Systems without InVircible keys
- are still protected, but recovery of these systems from virus attacks
- is performed only by qualified personnel with access to an InVircible
- registered floppy.
-
- Especially useful in an institutional environment are IVX and ResQdisk
- (see Sections 8 and 9). These utilities provide indispensable help to
- the institute's computer security experts for the recovery of "lost"
- hard drives and for tracking down sources of infection, especially of
- new vi ruses.
-
- 5.4 In Unattended Installations (e.g. Bulletin Board Systems - BBS).
-
- There are instances when the operation of a PC is unattended, such as
- in bulletin board systems etc. The daily inspection of IVB may in such
- cases pause the system, if the system was rebooted and IVB found
- changes in programs, when compared to their store signatures. To bypass
- the pause use the /nostop switch on IVB's command line in the AUTOEXEC,
- as follows:
-
- IVB C: DAILY /NOSTOP
-
- 6. IVB - The File Protection & Restoration Program.
-
- IVB will secure, authenticate and restore executable programs from
- virus infection and virus-like modifications, except for FAT/directory
- manipulators (see Section 10).
-
- IVB takes a 66 byte "snapshot" (signature) of critical information from
- each executable file and stores this information in each directory's
- InVircible database. This process is called "securing". The information
- is then used during "authentication" (also called "validation") to
- determine whether a file is modified by a virus. The database is also
- used to "restore" files that have been modified by viruses.
-
- Viruses are characterized by unique properties: They replicate into
- other programs, they modify the host program and they normally affect
- more than one program. All these anomalies are unmistakably detected by
- IVB.
-
- Common viruses will usually increase the size of a file, while
- Trojan-Horses typically decrease the size of a file by overwriting it.
- If IVB detects that more than one file is "modified" or "changed in
- size", then virus activity is indicated.
-
- A single modified file, or an inconsistent change pattern, may be a new
- version of an existing program. IVB will usually detect a version
- change and suggest to resecure the directory.
-
- IVB restores programs that have been secured. Prior to restoring files
- with IVB, scan first with IVSCAN to assure that the virus is not of a
- known type. Recovery with IVSCAN should be tried first, before
- restoring with IVB. The IVB command-line syntax is:
-
- IVB [-] [drive:\directory] [/option]
-
- The default drive and directory are the current ones. The various
- options are:
-
- none for authentication (the default),
- /S for secure,
- /R for restore,
- /D for delete and
- /V for the removal of the database files.
-
- Let IVMENU guide you through the options.
-
- The Delete option will erase files that have been decreased in size
- (potential Trojans) or files that cannot be restored safely.
-
- The [-] switch (space followed by a hyphen) indicates to IVB to operate
- on the specified directory only without continuing to any other
- directory or sub-directory.
-
- IVB will automatically secure added files when run in the default mode.
- The secure mode is to be used in case IVB indicates a modified file,
- which is a replacement rather than a modified one. Use the single
- directory switch to resecure a single directory by selecting it through
- IVMENU.
-
- IVB is tamper-resistant and will replace the database file of a
- particular file, if tampered with.
-
- IVB secures executable files (COM, EXE, SYS) only.
-
- Before attempting the recovery of a file by IVB you will be prompted
- with three options: Restore, Skip or All (restore all).
-
-
- 6.1 The IVB Extra-Security Feature.
-
- IVB has an extra security feature which allows the user to define the
- name of the database files. The default name is IVB.NTZ. This will
- prevent the destruction or modification of the IVB database files by a
- dedicated virus. It allows the user to define a unique database file
- name, other than the default. To set a different name to the database
- files use the Rename option from IVMENU's default. The database
- filename in use is indicated in the Caution Panel of IVMENU.
-
- 6.2 Off-line Backup of the InVircible Database.
-
- There are instances when an off-line backup of the database- files tree
- is desirable. Making such a backup is easy using the Off-line Backup
- option. Use IVMENU to produce an exact replica of the database file's
- tree on a previously formatted diskette in either floppy drive A: or
- B:. If necessary, the database files may be restored to their original
- locations by the Restore option of the Off-line Backup mode from
- IVMENU.
-
- A typical 200 Mbytes disk partition will require about 200 Kilobytes of
- space for an off-line InVircible backup.
-
- Attention LAN managers: An off-line backup for a typical 1 Gbytes file
- server can be contained on a single 1.44 Mbytes diskette.
-
-
- 7. IVX - The Correlation Scanner.
-
- IVX is a generic correlator, based on the comparison of files to a
- sample known to be infected. This way, IVX detects all the files that
- were infected by the same virus and can even trace down the source of
- the infection. IVX is ideal for isolating new viruses, or disinfecting
- a machine with no previous installation of InVircible on it.
-
- InVircible generates its own samples through IVINIT and IVTEST, either
- or both Virusample and Vir-Code. A file designated by IVB as changed,
- may also be used as a valid sample.
-
- IVX runs from either the command line or from IVMENU. The command line
- syntax is:
-
- IVX [pathname of sample file] [drive:\directory to search]
-
- Wildcards (*.?) are allowed in the sample's pathname.
-
- The IVX report is displayed in a graphic format, after the correlator
- completes its scan. You may also want to review the IVX report through
- IVMENU.
-
- Suspected files may be renamed through IVX to non executable extension
- names: COM to IVC and EXE to IVE. IVX will prompt before actually
- renaming a file. The renamed files may be safely copied to a floppy and
- sent or e-mailed to us for further analysis and evaluation.
-
- The detection threshold of IVX can be adjusted in a range from 1%, for
- highly polymorphic viruses, to 100%. The default is set to 20% of
- correlation.
-
- Tips for using IVX.
-
- The correlator is a powerful tool in the hands of a trained user and
- its findings are usually conclusive from the very first run. Yet, you
- should be aware that virus writers make great efforts to conceal their
- virus' presence. Therefore, do not expect a perfect match, but rarely,
- when using IVX with real viruses. The results of IVX should be regarded
- as relative, i.e. the files with the higher correlation are the more
- likely to be infected. Plain viruses may exhibit anything from 40% to
- 100% correlation to the sample, while highly polymorphic viruses may
- have as low as 4%. The conclusive evidence is that non-infected files
- are in even lower correlation with the sample.
-
- Before launching IVX, spot a few infected files that could be used as
- samples. The easiest is to look for them in the DOS directory.
- Frequently used files are usually the first victims of an infection.
- Boot from a clean DOS floppy and run IVX from a write protected or IV
- Armored floppy.
-
- When dealing with a virus that infects both COM and EXE files, prefer
- an infected EXE file as the sample, as it contains more relevant
- information than infected COM. The results will be more conclusive than
- with a COM sample.
-
- Before renaming suspected files through IVX, try a few runs with
- different detection thresholds. Review the report to chose the best
- threshold. The best is when all infected files are captured and the
- report contains no false positives. It's preferable to replace a few
- extra files in case of doubt, than to risk reinfection.
-
- Examples:
-
- Legend: â–“â–“--Statistics, â–’â–’--Encryption, â–‘â–‘--String.
-
- C:\JERUSALEM\
- â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–‘â–‘â–‘â–‘â–‘â–‘â–‘â–‘ 60 CHKDSK.EXE
- â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–‘â–‘â–‘â–‘â–‘â–‘â–‘â–‘ 60 EMM386.EXE
- â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–‘â–‘â–‘â–‘â–‘â–‘â–‘â–‘ 60 EXPAND.EXE
- â–“â–“â–“â–“â–“â–“â–“â–“â–“â–“â–“â–“â–“â–“â–“â–“â–“â–“â–“â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–‘â–‘â–‘â–‘â–‘â–‘â–‘â–‘ 100 DISKCOMP.COM
- â–“â–“â–“â–“â–“â–“â–“â–“â–“â–“â–“â–“â–“â–“â–“â–“â–“â–“â–“â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–‘â–‘â–‘â–‘â–‘â–‘â–‘â–‘ 100 MODE.COM
- â–“â–“â–“â–“â–“â–“â–“â–“â–“â–“â–“â–“â–“â–“â–“â–“â–“â–“â–“â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–‘â–‘â–‘â–‘â–‘â–‘â–‘â–‘ 100 MORE.COM
-
- The first example is of the Jerusalem virus. It infects both COM and
- EXE files. The sample used in this illustration is Virusample file,
- created automatically by IVTEST. The report shows 100% correlation of
- the COM files and 60% for EXE, since Jerusalem is a plain non-encrypted
- virus. If we had used Vir-Code instead, the results would be 100%
- correlation for EXE and 60% for COM, as Vir-Code is an EXE style
- sample, while Virusample is usually a COM one. The threshold was set to
- 50%, to filter out false positives.
-
- C:\MALTESE\
- â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’ 40 FORMAT.COM
- â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’ 40 MODE.COM
- â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’ 40 MORE.COM
- â–“â–“â–“â–“â–“â–“â–“â–“â–“â–“â–“â–“â–“â–“â–“â–“â–“â–“â–“â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–‘â–‘â–‘â–‘â–‘â–‘â–‘â–‘ 100 DELTREE.EXE
- â–“â–“â–“â–“â–“â–“â–“â–“â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’ 56 EXE2BIN.EXE
- â–“â–“â–“â–“â–“â–“â–“â–“â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’ 56 EXPAND.EXE
- â–“â–“â–“â–“â–“â–“â–“â–“â–“â–“â–“â–“â–“â–“â–“â–“â–“â–“â–“â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’â–’ 80 FC.EXE
-
- The second example was taken from Maltese Amoeba (alias Irish) and is
- especially interesting. Irish is heavily encrypted, although it is not
- considered as polymorphic. DELTREE.EXE is used as the sample. Note the
- dispersion in the correlation factor. Note also that the largest common
- correlation is contributed by encryption (the middle shading). As a
- rule, encrypted viruses will show no contribution from string matching,
- with most of the similarity due to encryption, and sometimes some
- contribution due to statistical matching. The threshold was set to 30%
- in this case.
-
- Practicing IVX.
-
- It may be worth to practice with IVX so that you know what to do when
- the real thing happens. You may use IVX to trace down files that were
- processed in the same way. For example, all InVircible files, except
- IVHELP, were processed by LZEXE runtime compression. Try the following:
-
- IVX C:\IV\IVB.EXE C:\
-
- All the files that correlate higher than 65% are treated by LZEXE as
- well. Now, if you correlate with IVHELP.EXE as the sample, IVX will
- find programs that were processed by PKLITE. You will find a few of in
- the DOS directory.
-
- Other compression schemes that can be used to practice IVX are: DIET
- and Microsoft's ExePack. Correlate to \DOS\EXPAND.EXE for ExePack and
- set the detection threshold to 70. For DIET, correlate to Frisk's
- F-PROT.EXE (if you got a copy) and set the threshold to 50.
-
-
- 8. ResQdisk - The Boot-Areas and CMOS Maintenance Program.
-
- ResQdisk is a compact yet extremely powerful utility capable of
- repairing damage to the hard disk partition or boot sector, removing
- known and unknown partition or boot viruses, restoring self booting
- capability to hard disks and regaining access to "lost" hard disks.
-
- ResQdisk deals uniquely with hard disks drives, not with floppies.
-
- Disks are organized in sectors, which are 512 bytes data storage units.
- Any DOS hard drive has two such vital sectors: the master boot sector
- (sometimes referred to as the partition table) and the boot sector.
- Floppies have only a boot sector. These sectors are favorite targets
- for computer viruses, since they contain tiny programs that load first
- at booting time. A damaged or missing sector will return an "invalid
- drive specification" message, fail to boot, deny access to the hard
- drive or simply read trash from the disk.
-
- For maximum safety, the boot area images are written to the Rescue
- Diskette, since an inaccessible disk will deny access to the backup
- written to itself. ResQdisk's options are displayed on the menu bar, at
- the screen's bottom. Press F1 or "/" to see more options.
-
- The F1-F2 key sequence will backup the boot areas and the F1- F3
- sequence will restore from backup images to disk. Each sector can be
- individually backed up or restored by shifting to the desired sector on
- screen (use the cursor direction keys) and pressing either B for backup
- or R for restore.
-
- Every disk has a unique partition and boot sector. Do not attempt to
- swap or copy boot areas between hard-disks. This might end up with an
- unreadable contents of the transplant's receptor.
-
- 8.1 Reconstruction of the Boot Block.
-
- ResQdisk has special routines for the reconstruction of the hard disk
- partition or boot sector, in case they have been damaged or cannot be
- recovered. For example, incidentally booting a disk which is infected
- with Stoned with a floppy infected by Michelangelo will not boot
- anymore by itself, although it can be booted from a DOS floppy.
- Attempting to restore the partition with the FDISK command may end up
- with the complete loss of the whole disk content.
-
- ResQdisk makes it easy; all that is needed is the following keys
- sequence:
-
- Press the 'Home' key, then F1, then F4
-
- Tampering with the boot sector is corrected by the sequence:
-
- Left arrow, F1, F4
-
- 8.2 ResQdisk's Special Functions.
-
- It may happen that the disk setup parameters stored in the CMOS become
- invalid because of a weak battery, a setup error and sometimes even bad
- software. If this happens then reboot the computer from the rescue
- diskette and press <Enter> when IVMENU finished loading into memory.
- Answer yes to the query "Attempt to restore the CMOS data?". The
- computer will then automatically reboot with the restored CMOS
- parameters.
-
- To see ResQdisk special functions menu press the "/" (slash) key.
-
- Warning! ResQdisk should not be used on disks that have a boot area
- password or access control device installed on them. These devices are
- highly susceptible to cause total loss of the whole disk content. As a
- rule of thumb: If a hard disk can be accessed after booting from a DOS
- floppy, then the partition refresh procedure may be used safely.
-
- 8.3 ResQdisk's Setup Utility.
-
- ResQdisk has a built-in setup calculator. This may be especially useful
- with IDE hard drives, in case the CMOS data was erased or nullified and
- there is no available data on the drive parameters. All that is needed
- is to select a random disk type from the setup table, boot from a DOS
- floppy and run ResQdisk. The F5 function key will identify the
- manufacturer's parameters of the hard disk. All that is needed now is
- to set the CMOS data to the correct type and restart the computer.
-
- ResQdisk can also be used to regain access to an inaccessible hard
- drive, whether either the partition sector or the boot sector was
- damaged. ResQdisk will indicate "Press Ctrl F1" or "Press Ctrl F2" to
- rebuild the partition or the boot sector respectively.
-
- 9. IVSCAN - The Virus Detection and Removal Scanner.
-
- While disinfecting a computer, with IVSCAN or else, the user must be
- aware of the possibility that a virus might be active in the computer's
- memory (memory-resident). Since a virus in memory has taken control of
- the computer, a general rule is to reboot an infected computer from the
- write- protected Rescue Diskette, or from a clean write-protected DOS
- diskette. The disinfection of a hard-disk must be per formed only from
- the Rescue Diskette and not from the suspected drive itself, unless
- InVircible's programs specifically recommend execution in an infected
- environment (e.g. Inverse Piggybacking).
-
- Detection of, and disinfection from known and common viruses is done by
- IVSCAN. The program is activated via IVMENU or directly from the
- command line. The command line syntax is:
-
- IVSCAN [-] [where and what to scan] [/Option]
-
- Parameters in [ ] are optional. If no option is chosen IVSCAN will
- detect viruses without removing them (the default). The default scan
- path are the current directory and its sub-directories. The use of
- wildcards (*,?) is allowed in specifying where and what to scan for.
-
- The options are:
-
- /R to restore the file (if it can),
- /D to delete infected files that IVSCAN cannot recover,
- /B to recover or replace a suspected boot sector in floppies,
- or MBR on hard drive.
- /EX to scan executable files only.
-
- The [-] parameter will limit IVSCAN to process the specified directory
- only.
-
- Examples: To scan the entire C: partition for viruses in the Detection-
- Only mode type:
- IVSCAN C:\
-
- To use IVSCAN for detecting and eliminating viruses automatically only
- from COM files in the DOS directory, type:
-
- IVSCAN + C:\DOS\*.COM /R -
-
- The space before the hyphen is required. If the hyphen is not used,
- this command will cause IVSCAN to begin at the specified directory and
- scan all subsequent sub-directories.
-
- If IVSCAN indicates "use IVB to restore" and the affected files were
- properly secured, then restore them with IVB (see Section 6). Use the
- Delete option as a last resort. A list of infected, deleted and
- restored files will be written to a IVSCAN.RPT file in the root
- directory of the processed drive, to help you replace the deleted
- files.
-
- Before attempting the recovery of a file IVSCAN will prompt you with
- three options: Recover, Skip or All (recover all).
-
- 9.1 Removal of Generic Boot Viruses.
-
- Boot viruses are transferred from one computer to another by
- accidentally booting from an infected floppy (the infected diskette is
- left in drive A and the computer is rebooted), even if the floppy is
- not bootable, just infected! IVSCAN provides for the replacement of the
- boot sector in floppies with a standard DOS boot sector. The same
- procedure will remove generic boot infectors and even restore
- readability to 3.5" floppies that were hit by boot infectors such as
- Michelangelo. Just type:
-
- IVSCAN drive: /B
-
- IVSCAN restores files infected by viruses included in its repertoire.
- For infectors unknown to IVSCAN use IVB.
-
-
- 10. A Primer to Generic and Special Methods.
-
- Generic techniques can cure damage from groups of viruses such as
- boot-block infectors, stealthy file infectors and FAT manipulators.
-
- First, assess the type of infection by its symptoms, then test the
- suggested method on a sample diskette or directory. If successful,
- apply the selected technique onto the entire infected disk.
-
-
- 10.1 Generic Method Selection
-
- As a rule, viruses always disclose there presence sooner or later.
- InVircible provides alerts when sensing various effects that are
- unmistakably related to computer viruses. Among InVircible's messages,
- the following are of special interest:
-
- (1) "... Kbytes are missing from total available memory."
- (2) "A stealthy virus is active in system."
- (3) "File size changed by 0 (zero!) bytes ... "
- (4) "Free disk space decreased by ... bytes, program halted!"
- (5) "Partition (or boot) sector is faked!" (6)"The disk is infected by
- a boot infector!"
-
- Message (1) indicates "memory stealing", attributed mostly to the
- presence of a boot or partition infector. Certain file infectors do the
- same, and this possibility should be first discarded. Also, some
- programs such as DesqView, or certain BIOSes (PS, Dell, Acer and some
- laptops) cause the same without being related to virus activity.
-
- Message (2) or (3) indicate that a stealthy virus is active in the
- system.
-
- Message (4) indicates that a piggybacking process was detected and the
- search was halted to prevent further spreading of the virus.
-
- Message (5) indicates the presence of a stealth virus in one of the
- boot area sectors. Message (6) will be displayed when an unknown boot
- infector is found in one of the boot areas of the hard disk or of a
- floppy.
-
- In case the virus is common, InVircible will recommend on the
- corrective action. If not, then proceed as follows.
-
- It is recommended that less experienced users ask for assistance or
- leave the following procedures to qualified personnel, since dealing
- with smart viruses requires training and inexperienced users may do
- more harm than good.
-
- For the expert user.
-
- If one or more of the above messages are returned, then proceed with
- the following tests.
-
- Run IVB in its default mode with the virus in memory and watch if
- "modified files" are reported. In case such files are reported with
- the virus in memory, the virus is not a perfect stealthy one and
- cannot be restored by the Inverse Piggybacking or by the Integrity
- Interrogation generic methods.
-
- Next, boot from the Rescue Diskette and run IVSCAN to eliminate the
- possibility of a common infector. In case that IVSCAN reports the
- possibility of an unknown boot or partition infector, then proceed
- with the generic boot- block recovery.
-
- Non-perfect stealthy viruses can be recovered by IVB if the disk
- contents was previously secured.
-
- If the virus is a perfect stealthy (only), select either the Virus
- Interrogation technique or the Inverse Piggy- backing. Always try
- first on a floppy, which is the best technique to use for a
- particular virus.
-
- Beware of FAT manipulators! Run CHKDSK on the damaged unit, without
- the /F switch, when booted from a clean DOS diskette. Watch if file
- allocation error or cross-linking of executable files is reported.
- If yes, this may be the doing of a FAT manipulating virus.
-
- Do not attempt repair with disk fixing utilities if infected by a
- FAT manipulator. Any such attempt will end in massive and
- irreversible damage.
-
- In all cases, it is advised to test the selected method on a sample
- diskette and if successful, to apply it to the infected units.
-
-
- 10.2 Generic Boot-Block Recovery
-
- InVircible and DOS provide for the recovery of both the Master Boot
- Sector, also known as the partition table sector, and the plain Boot
- Sector. Both sectors are found only on hard disks, while floppies have
- only a boot-sector.
-
- Floppies:
-
- IVSCAN provides for the recovery of a large spectrum of known and
- generic boot infectors, and will suggest the replacement of the sector
- with a standard DOS 5 one, in case a potential unknown infector is
- found. Hard Disk:
-
- The recovery should always start by inspecting the partition table
- first. Run ResQdisk to get acquainted with the look of both the
- master-boot-sector (MBS) and the system-boot-sector of your hard-drive.
- In case of boot-block tampering, boot from the Rescue Diskette and
- visually inspect both sectors by running ResQdisk. Some infectors such
- as FLIP will cause only minor changes, perceivable only to the expert
- observer, some as Stoned will show a message such as "Your PC is
- Stoned, Legalize Marijuana!". The restoration of both sectors is
- straightforward by ResQdisk .
-
- There are instances when there is no copy of the original sector to
- restore from, and no Rescue Diskette exists. For example, consecutive
- infections by Stoned and Michelangelo will not leave an original MBS.
- Master Boot Sectors can be restored by ResQdisk, provided the drive is
- accessible and readable after booting from a DOS disk in drive A.
-
- Enter the ResQdisk program and proceed with the F1 - F4 function keys
- sequence. This procedure is the equivalent of the DOS-5 undocumented
- command: FDISK/MBR.
-
- Caution! Do not use the ResQdisk F1-F4 procedure in the following
- cases:
-
- (1) There is an active virus-prevention TSR in memory. Ad dressing
- the master-boot-sector may be diverted by such TSR and this may
- end in total loss of access to the hard- drive.
- (2) The same applies for hard-disks with a software password
- installed. Uninstall the password prior to proceeding with this
- technique.
- (3) Partitioning schemes other than DOS FDISK such as Disk Manager and
- SpeedStor are not suitable for this technique.
-
- As a safety precaution, first backup the boot-areas on the original
- InVircible diskette by ResQdisk and the F1-F2 keys sequence. The
- current boot areas can be restored later by ResQdisk.
-
- An alternative way to ResQdisk, for replacing the boot sector is by
- booting from a clean DOS diskette, necessarily of the same DOS version
- as installed on the hard disk and transferring a fresh sector by the
- command SYS C: The Rescue Diskette will normally contain the SYS.COM
- file and it may be used for the purpose. In case of a damaged or
- nullified boot sector, DOS will not let to renew the sector by the sys
- command (the message "invalid media type" is returned by DOS), and
- ResQdisk will become the only way to recover the drive.
-
- Recovery from Boot Stealth Viruses.
-
- The procedure that follows will probably never be necessary for the
- registered user, as boot spoofers are taken care of in IVINIT, right at
- boot time, as well as in IVSCAN. It is brought here mainly as a
- work-around for unregistered users and to explain the mechanics of boot
- spoofers.
-
- ResQdisk can be used for the recovery from boot stealth viruses.
- Inappropriate procedures with boot spoofers may cause the loss of
- access to the hard disk, as happens indeed with quite many scanner and
- TSR anti virus products. ResQdisk enables full recovery from viruses
- such as from Monkey, Newbug, Quox and many others.
-
- The presence of a boot stealth virus is announced by IVINIT or IVTEST,
- with the message "faked partition (or boot) sector". The virus is then
- sampled into a file labeled PARTVIR or BOOTVIR accordingly.
-
- Run ResQdisk and confirm the presence of the stealth virus by switching
- between SeeThru "ON" and "OFF" - with the F9 key, while watching the
- master partition sector, or the boot sector. Create a backup of the
- infected sector by pressing the "B" key, while SeeThru is OFF. The
- backup content is the true boot sector.
-
- Registered users may switch now the SeeThru to "ON" and restore the
- sector from the backup by pressing the "R" key. The original sector,
- rendered by the virus, will be written to the hard disk, in its right
- place. Unregistered users will have to run the above from a floppy,
- reboot the machine from clean DOS and then restore the original sector
- in place by running ResQdisk from the floppy.
-
- Exit ResQdisk and reboot the computer without running anything else!
- The computer will restart with a clean boot block. Note that the
- recovery from boot stealth viruses must run with the virus ACTIVE in
- memory!
-
- 10.3 Fat Manipulators Removal
-
- The FAT manipulating viruses appeared at the end of 1991 and use a new
- method for propagation, based on the modification of the FAT pointers
- chain. There are now at least two widespread such viruses, DIR-2
- (Creeping Death) and 1963 (Niemela). These viruses are inherently
- stealthy and propagate extremely fast. Standard passive scanners are
- useless and harmful against these viruses. Countless hard disks were
- unnecessarily destroyed by the use of passive anti virus scanners
- against these two viruses. MSAV, the virus scanner distributed with
- Microsoft's MS-DOS 6, is an example of a passive scanner. Although it
- detects the 1963 (Niemela) virus and claims to clean it from infected
- files, in reality it ruins all the files it "cleans" from this virus.
-
- InVircible provides a totally safe and extremely efficient means for
- both the detection and the full recovery from these and other FAT
- manipulators. FAT manipulators are removed by an active Inverse
- Piggybacking process.
-
- The presence of DIR-2 or 1963 is detected by InVircible programs and
- is indicated by a warning message.
-
- In case a FAT manipulator virus activity is suspected, do not use the
- DOS CHKDSK/F switch, until the disk is completely disinfected! Using
- the /F switch while a FAT manipulating virus is active will cause
- massive and irreversible damage .
-
- 10.4 Inverse Piggy-Backing (IP).
-
- The Inverse Piggy-Backing (also called cooperative virus removal) is a
- generic technique embedded in IVSCAN. It is based on forcing the
- infecting virus to disinfect its own doing. There are two available
- methods actually, labeled /M1 and /M2.
-
- Method 1 is effective against "light" stealthy infectors such as 4096
- (Frodo) and 1963 (Niemela).
-
- Method 2 is to be used to disinfect from the more "stubborn" ones such
- as DIR-2 and future FAT manipulators. Inverse Piggybacking is selected
- from IVMENU, from the Virus Scanner mode.
-
- The command line syntax for Inverse Piggybacking is:
-
- IVSCAN drive: /Mn,
-
- /Mn being the method switch and "n" its number, for example, type
- IVSCAN C: /M1 to run method 1 on drive C.
-
- Inverse Piggy-Backing should start with the virus loaded in memory.
- Start by purposely running an infected file. In most case the operating
- system itself will be infected so that you may proceed directly to
- disinfection.
-
- The DIR-2 virus will lock up the computer if run under DOS-5 or
- DR-DOS-6. To disinfect from DIR-2 one should boot from DOS lower than 5.
-
- Method 1 is a single pass procedure. The processed drive will be
- operable after its completion.
-
- Method 2 requires two passes. On the first one COM/EXE files will be
- processed by the virus itself. A second pass with the IVSCAN /M3 switch
- restore the files to their original state. Disks processed with the /M2
- switch, except partition C, will require processing with the /M3
- switch to have their executable files restored to original.
-
- Only partition C will be automatically cycled by M2/M3 processing. The
- IVSCAN.EXE program should reside on drive C for complete and automatic
- processing of this drive.
-
- Important! Turn off all disk caching before starting Inverse
- Piggybacking. Some disk caches oppose the IP technique. InVircible
- takes care of turning off the SMARTDRV.EXE cache. For other brands,
- consult the cache documentation on how to turn it off. Floppies and
- hard-disk partitions, other than C should be processed first. Partition
- C will be processed last. When finished with C, automatic rebooting
- will occur.
-
- Caution! Do not run any program, nor address the hard drive until
- rebooted, otherwise the drive will be immediately re infected.
-
- 10.5 The Integrity Interrogation technique.
-
- This technique is a two step procedure. First, file database are
- established from an infected environment, then the files are restored
- by IVB , from a clean environment.
-
- The theoretical basis of this method lies in the fact that some viruses
- are so perfectly "stealthy", that they "show" the true uninfected file
- data to the operating system, when inquired about.
-
- Start by booting the computer from the infected drive itself. Make sure
- the virus is active by running a program known to be infected. IVB
- should be installed on the processed drive.
-
- Run IVB drive: /S (or the Secure option from IVMENU) on the entire
- directory or drive. Restart from the Rescue Diskette and run IVB in its
- Restore mode.
-
- 10.6 Forced Self Restoration.
-
- The InVircible programs (except IVHELP, which is licensed from another
- vendor) will normally restore themselves in case they are attacked by a
- virus. In certain cases the program will get infected and stuck, thus
- inhibiting its self recovery. In such cases a little assistance from
- the user will be helpful: just type the infected program's name with
- the /FR (forced recovery) switch. For example, IVB/FR. Switch the
- computer off afterward since the virus may be now resident in memory.
-
-
- 10.7 Screening New Software.
-
- InVircible is ideal for screening new software, to assure it is free of
- virus. Software screening is especially important in organizations,
- where viruses are usually introduced with new software, without having
- been screened first.
-
- The screening of software should be performed on an isolated computer
- (never when logged into a network). InVircible should be installed on
- the screening computer and a rescue diskette prepared for it.
-
- Install the new software on the hard disk according to its
- manufacturer's instructions, then "secure" it with IVB before actually
- running it. The new software should then be run and all its executable
- modules should be exercised. Reboot the computer from the rescue
- diskette and scan the hard disk with IVB for changes in files. Inspect
- the boot block for changes with ResQdisk. Compare the MBS and boot
- sector by individually "restoring" them from backup and watch for
- changes. Now reboot the computer from its own hard disk and watch for
- InVircible's warning messages. If all tests passed without findings
- then the software is most likely clean from known or unknown viruses.
-
-
- 11. Importing InVircible into Windows
-
- InVircible is distributed with IV.PIF and IV.ICO files, to operate
- under Windows. Both files will be copied to the InVircible default
- directory by the Install utility.
-
- Start Windows normally and import InVircible into Windows by selecting
- New from the File menu and the Browse radio button. Use IV.PIF as the
- command line and IV.ICO as InVircible's icon.
-
- We also suggest to add Alt+Ctrl+V as the shortcut key, when in the
- properties change menu. Now InVircible can be activated from Windows by
- either double clicking on its icon, or by pressing Alt+Ctrl+V.
-
- As stated elsewhere in this guide, viruses operate only in the DOS
- environment. InVircible sometimes uses virus cooperative techniques.
- Viruses are not "well behaved" in an environment different from DOS.
- Therefore, it is recommended that only passive tasks such as integrity
- checking or virus scanning is done from Windows. Active disinfection,
- such as Inverse Piggybacking should not be attempted from Windows, but
- only from plain DOS.
-
- 12. Virus Handling Under OS/2
-
- Computer viruses are often called DOS viruses, which implies that they
- are programmed to operate only under DOS. However, any operating system
- that is DOS compatible is susceptible to DOS viruses when in DOS
- compatibility mode.
-
- InVircible is compatible with the IBM OS/2+ operating system when in
- DOS mode. Because DOS internals are interpreted differently by OS/2,
- DOS viruses behave unexpectedly in an OS/2-DOS environment. Whenever
- InVircible detects viral activity in an OS/2 environment, proceed as
- follows:
-
- Simply COLD BOOT the computer from the Rescue Diskette and proceed
- normally with IVSCAN and IVB procedures. All virus disinfection should
- be undertaken only in a DOS environment. Do NOT attempt to boot DOS
- from the OS/2 dual booting system when viral activity is reported or
- suspected. When done, reboot the computer normally.
-
-
- 13. Central Point Anti Virus Inoculation
-
- The CPAV Inoculation or self integrity check is the cause of many
- unexplained malfunctions. Many programs do not tolerate being
- inoculated, especially not DOS files, but not only them.
-
- The inoculation process consists of the encapsulation of executable
- files (COM and EXE) in a protective shell, like a cocoon. The
- inoculation adds about 700 or 900 bytes to COM and EXE files,
- respectively. The inoculation also modifies the programs in other ways.
-
- Inoculation has many drawbacks and practically no merits. First, the
- 700 to 900 bytes added waste a lot of disk space. Second, inoculation
- causes programs to malfunction, especially under MS-DOS-6+. Third, the
- recovery of an immunized file will in most cases worsen the situation.
- In order to drop the virus the infected file must be run, at the risk
- of loading the virus into memory and infecting other files. And last,
- inoculation is useless against smart viruses and is not worth the
- trouble!
-
- Except for its malfunctions, there are good reasons why not to
- inoculate programs. The inoculation may hide a virus that infected the
- file prior to its inoculation. A dedicated virus may simply peel off
- the inoculation, infect the file and then re inoculate it as if nothing
- happened.
-
- InVircible will indicate files immunized by CPAV by either scanning
- with IVSCAN or IVB.
-
- Unfortunately there are differences between versions of CPAV, so it is
- safer to disimmunize files by the same product that inoculated them in
- the first place. Use the following procedure only if there is no other
- alternative, and with all precautions.
-
- Backup the files to be recovered. IVSCAN will remove the CPAV
- inoculation from files when in the virus "remove" mode.
-
- 14. The Antivirus TSR (Terminate and Stay Resident).
-
- Memory resident programs (TSR) have been in use since computer viruses
- appeared in 1987. Their purpose is to prevent the penetration of a
- virus to the computer.
-
- Unfortunately, the TSR virus prevention is based on too many weak
- assumptions. Anti virus TSR look only for viruses included in their
- database. There are today as many as 5000 known viruses and their
- number increases at a constant rate of 50 to 100 per month. This number
- takes a heavy toll on the size of the database attached to the TSR and
- occupies precious memory space.
-
- Anti-virus TSR can be aggressive, affect the computer's performance,
- interfere with other applications, cause conflicts in memory and are
- potentially dangerous! For example, a typical and common AV TSR slows
- the computer by a factor of 3 to 5 and is notorious for having knocked
- out many hard disks that it was supposed to protect, without the
- slightest trace of any virus. The TSR simply defeated itself by
- derouting interrupt 13 (the one used for disk read and write) to
- deceive boot viruses, and fell in its own trap!
-
- TSRs need to be constantly updated. The assumption that the producer of
- the TSR will be the first to examine any new virus, proved to be false
- in most cases. The TSR is useless against new viruses, neither will it
- detect a known, but modified virus. Practically, a TSR older than six
- months is out-of-date, in most cases it is already obsolete at the date
- of its announcement. VSAFE, the anti-virus TSR distributed with MS-DOS
- 6, is a grim reminder of this fact.
-
- Anti virus TSR suffer from false alarms and the higher the number of
- viruses a product detects, the higher is the rate of its false alarms.
- The common user has practically no means to distinguish between a false
- alarm and a real virus.
-
- Furthermore, TSR are incapable of distinguishing between a real virus
- and a faked signature, which explains their susceptibility to false
- alarms. For example, the following string of 10 bytes, when added to
- any program, will mislead McAfee's antivirus products to believe the
- program is infected with the Jerusalem virus. Consequently, VSHIELD
- (the TSR) will inhibit the execution of the program, SCAN will "detect"
- the Jeru-A virus and CLEAN will ravage the file containing the string
- as if it was really infected with "Jerusalem". The faked Jerusalem
- virus string, in hex notation:
-
- 03 F3 A5 26 C6 06 FE 03 CB 58
-
- AV TSR got bad reputation over the past years: the number of incidents
- in which anti-virus TSR were the direct cause of severe damage
- surpassed those caused by genuine viruses.
-
- Weighing the pros and cons for and against anti-virus TSR leads to the
- conclusion that TSR are a constant nuisance and threat to the health of
- your computer. The remote possibility that a TSR will really stop a
- banal virus attack, that could be removed anyway by less dangerous
- means, is not worth the trouble and the risks of the TSR!
-
-
- 15. Procedures to Use if Virus Activity is Suspected.
-
- When dealing with computer viruses, awareness is the key to success. Do
- not improvise. Do not panic or act hastily. If there is no apparent
- damage, in most cases no further damage will occur until the computer
- is switched off and rebooted.
-
- Computer viruses are nothing else than programs themselves. A computer
- will not become infected unless an infected program is executed.
- Reading data cannot cause infection whatsoever!
-
- If you suspect the computer is infected with a virus, proceed as
- follows:
-
- a. Do not switch the computer off immediately. If you have already
- turned off the computer, do not reboot the computer from its own
- hard-disk but rather from the Rescue-Diskette or from a clean and
- write-protected DOS floppy.
-
- b. Save the data of the last job you were working on and exit
- normally from the application you were in. Do not start a new job
- as long as the computer wasn't verified and cleaned.
-
- The following steps will enable you to recover from a virus event with
- the minimum of disruption:
-
- a. Have the Rescue Diskette always ready as well as a copy of your
- favorite backup program, both on write protected diskettes.
-
- b. Boot from the Rescue Diskette and backup all important data.
- Programs can always be reloaded from original disks, data cannot.
- Copy several infected files to a diskette for later inspection.
- Do not start disinfecting the computer without completing the
- above steps. There is a possibility that irreversible things may
- happen in the course of virus removal. In fact, most of the
- damage caused by viral incidents is the result of inappropriate
- disinfection procedures.
-
- c. After the system is cold rebooted from the Rescue Disk, first run
- IVSCAN to test for common viruses. Remove the viruses as
- described in section 10. Next run IVB.
-
- d. After disinfection, do not hurry restoring files from backup,
- without verifying its contents first! The backups are likely to
- contain the same virus you just removed. Consider rebuilding your
- applications from the original software manufacturer's diskettes.
- Retain data only from the most recent backups, to minimize the
- possibility of repeated infections from your own backups.
-
- Viruses propagate in many ways. Smart viruses use stealth, self
- encryption or both. The more programs run, the higher the chances are
- of unintentionally activating a virus.
-
- Do not use shell programs or utilities while disinfecting a computer,
- certainly not from the infected disk itself. Do not run any program
- from the infected disk.
-
- Use plain and internal DOS commands such as DEL, REN, COPY etc. If you
- feel uncomfortable with these limitations, ask for assistance from a
- more knowledgeable user. All programs should be run from
- write-protected diskettes and reliable sources. The only exceptions are
- when explicitly instructed to work from an infected environment, such
- as for Inverse Piggybacking or Virus Interrogation, as explained
- elsewhere.
-
- Be consistent! Do not mix InVircible with other anti-virus software or
- hardware. Unraveling the results of mixing anti- virus methods is
- similar to attempting a medical diagnosis for an intoxicated patient
- that has swallowed multiple self- prescribed drugs.
-
- A virus in memory is a virus in control of the computer, while you may
- believe you are. Viruses are extremely deceitful programs, and will
- mislead even experienced users.
-
- Many viruses seek to infect the command interpreter. This is the file
- denominated by the environment string "COMSPEC" when typing the SET
- command. Therefore, it is good practice to replace the COMSPEC file
- from an original diskette. Also, rename the AUTOEXEC.BAT and the
- CONFIG.SYS to non-executable names until disinfection is completed.
-
-
- 16. For Computer Security Experts and Advanced Users.
-
- Rehearse with real viruses on an isolated (not in a network) computer
- to get the feel of what a virus attack is like. Virus simulating
- programs are worthless in the forming of computer security experts. On
- the contrary, any anti-virus program that responds to a simulated virus
- is also susceptible to false alarms and will destroy programs in an
- attempt to remove an imaginary virus. Experiment only with
- "controllable" viruses such as Stoned, Jerusalem and Frodo (4096).
-
- And last, prepare a recovery plan and simulate it on a small scale,
- prior to being hit by a real computer virus. When the real thing
- happens, you will feel much more at ease if you have an idea of what a
- real virus attack is like and have practiced before.
-